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Abstract
This paper offers an account of an important type of human relationship: 
relationships based on shared ends. These are an indispensable part of 
most ethically worthy or valuable lives, and our successes or failures at 
participating in these relationships constitute a great number of our moral 
successes or failures overall. While many philosophers agree about their 
importance, few provide us with well-developed accounts of the nature 
and value of good shared-end relationships. This paper begins to develop 
a positive account of such relationships. In the interest of highlighting 
some strengths and weaknesses of competing approaches, it contrasts 
the theories that are proposed by the Confucian philosopher Dai Zhen 
 (1724–1777) and the influential moral philosopher Immanuel Kant 
(1724–1804). Both philosophers share many of the same core ethical 
commitments, but as the author shows, Dai Zhen’s approach to thinking 
about the nature and value of good shared-end relationships is superior 
to Kant’s because it highlights the fact that such relationships must be 
motivated by ethically-shaped forms of other-concern and self-interest, 
whereas Kant does not picture self-interest as an important source 
of morality or ethically valuable relationships. The author considers 
clarifications and revisions to Kant’s theory that seem to make more room 
for the mixture of motives required for good shared-end relationships, 
but concludes that these ad hoc modifications do not succeed at providing 
a recognizably Kantian theory that can account for them as well as 
Dai Zhen’s. 
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1. Introduction 
I start from an assumption that most people (in most times and 
places) will share, which is that ethics is substantially concerned 
with re lation ships between particular individuals. To give a full ac-
counting of our day-to-day successes and failures as ethical agents, 
we would need to talk about how and in what respects we meet 
and fall short of ethical norms that arise in part because of our 
obligations to be good parents, children, siblings, friends, neighbors, 
supervisors, or colleagues. Furthermore, I assume that some of the 
distinctive goods that we realize through these relationships require 
what I will call shared ends. Roughly, these are outcomes or states 
of affairs that two or more ethical agents value noninstrumentally, 
goals that they both (or all) regard as valuable independently of 
whether or not they promote some further good or valuable state. 
Moreover, sharing ends with people is part of what it means to be 
in certain kinds of relationship with them. If I do not have some 
common interests with my would-be close friends, if their welfare 
and important projects did not have some final value for me, then 
there is a sense in which they’re not really my close friends. Some-
thing similar is true for relationships between family members, and 
perhaps even work colleagues and neighbors or members of the 
same club or community.
Many moral philosophers would agree that it is good for us to 
develop and enjoy shared-end relationships and that doing so may 
be ethically valuable, insofar as we must develop good shared-end 
relationships in order to be good parents, friends, colleagues, and 
so forth. However, few Western moral philosophers provide us with 
well-developed accounts of the nature and value of good shared-end 
relationships, and it is unclear whether they have the right conceptual 
apparatus to do so. With those issues in mind, this paper begins to 
develop a positive account of good shared-end relationships and 
their value. In the interest of highlighting some strengths and weak-
nesses of competing approaches, I contrast the accounts that are 
sug gested by the Confucian philosopher Dai Zhen  (1724–1777) and 
the influential moral philosopher Immanuel Kant (1724–1804). 
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My basic thesis is that Dai Zhen’s approach to thinking about 
the nature and value of good shared-end relationships is superior to 
Kant’s because it highlights the fact that good shared-end relationships 
must be motivated by ethically-shaped forms of other-concern and 
self-interest. As we will see, this view contrasts with Kant’s approach 
in part because Kant does not picture self-interest as an important 
source of morality or ethically valuable relationships. Of course, it 
is possible to revise Kant’s theory so as to better accommodate such 
motives. Nonetheless, Kant’s writings are so systematically devoted to 
clearly distinguishing natural inclination and self-love from what he 
regards as the proper source of moral motivation that such changes 
come at considerable cost to the integrity and core commitments of 
his moral philosophy. By contrast, Dai quite arguably built his entire 
ethical theory around what I will call good relationships of mutual 
fulfillment. At the same time, Dai was in certain respects a kindred 
spirit to Kant: he sought to articulate a system of thought based on the 
assumption that we should value others as we value ourselves, that 
treat the interests of others as mattering for their sake (rather than 
instrumentalizing or subordinating their interests to one’s own good 
or a greater good), and that conceives of moral norms as those which 
all parties can in principle affirm. Dai thus offers a way to account for 
good shared-end relationships that many Kantians would be inclined 
to endorse, or at least more inclined to endorse than, say, straight-
forward utilitarian or other consequentialist justifications. 
This article is organized as follows. Section 2 explains how self-
interest factors in among the rich mixture of motives necessary for 
such relationships. Section 3 describes relationships based on shared 
ends, called “relationships of mutual fullilllment,” and notes some 
conditions that make some of them (a subset) good ones. Section 
4 gives a brief overview of Dai Zhen’s ethics, one that aims both to 
high light some of the more Kantian features of his framework and to 
show how it serves to justify the rich mixture of motives necessary for 
relationships that are mutually fulfilling and good. Section 5 explains 
why both Kant himself and a promising revision of Kant’s ethics cannot 
account for the comparative ethical value of these relationships.
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2. Mutual Fulfillment and Self-Interest
In order to have meaningful relationships in the relevant sense, most 
of us will need a rich mixture of motives that include some self-
interested ones. Consider close friendship again. To be a close friend 
with Jiaying, I should have some common interests with her. These 
might be a shared hobby or social cause or intellectual pursuit, but our 
common interests should also include (1) maintaining our friendship, 
and (2) one another’s well-being and success. Part of what makes me 
a close friend to Jiaying is that I take her happiness, contentment, 
and flourishing to have some final value for me, so that I derive 
gratification, from them. But if pressed to explain what motivates me 
to support Jiaying and cultivate our friendship, I would answer that 
it is a complex array of care for Jiaying, shared interests, and self-
concern. I am partly motivated by my care for Jiaying for her sake, 
my love of the friendship as such, and the benefits that friendship 
has for me. If I am helping her in some ambitious project of hers, I 
reflect on how her success will strengthen our friendship, how we will 
someday reminisce about the time that she undertook the project and 
prevailed with support from friends like me, and this strengthens my 
resolve and commitment to helping her and enhances the joy that I 
derive from doing so. If Jiaying is in peril and needs my help to avoid 
catastrophe, I help her because I cannot bear to see her life fall apart, 
but it also helps to think (and seems constitutive of a good friendship 
to think) that she would do the same for me if I were in peril, and that 
gives me some satisfaction and contentment which figure prominently 
in the motivational set that helps to sustain our friendship.
Perhaps a saintly person would feel differentlyshe might care 
about her friend’s success and welfare entirely for the friend’s sake, 
with no thought of its benefits for herself, and care with as much 
passion and commitment to the friend’s success as I have for Jiaying’s 
success. Quite often, in moral philosophy and in public discourse 
about ethics, we see people praise and prioritize this sort of self-
less ness or purity of motive. Whether they are right to prioritize it 
depends on its exact implications for the sorts of ethical character and 
behavior we should value and strive to emulate, but in most cases and 
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for most purposes, it is a mistake to do so. First, vanishingly few of us 
are saints or potential saints. In almost all cases, we need a rich array 
of mixed motives in order to have the right sort of commitments to 
friends and derive the right sort of satisfactions from friendship.1 And 
in those overwhelming number of cases, it is better to be a close and 
deeply invested friend than a distant but altruistic one.
Second, even if sainthood were a live option for us, I doubt that 
saintly friendships actually qualify as good relationships in the 
rele vant sense. One characteristic of good relationships of many 
kinds is that they are characteristically and deliberately reciprocal 
and fair. Perhaps in some special cases the sacrifices can be asym-
metrical or one-sided, as when one friend is in an ongoing crisis 
and in no position to help. But, characteristically, the sacrifices and 
willingness to sacrifice should be more symmetrical. If my friendship 
with Jiaying were largely organized around my own success and 
happiness and only incidentally or occasionally served Jiaying’s 
interests, there is a sense in which we are not really friends at all. 
Furthermore, imagine that Jiaying did not see the friendship as 
being good for her, and yet she continued to spend a good deal of 
her time and energy on maintaining it. If the friendship were to 
end, she would be sad and see it as a loss for my sake but not for 
hers. In short, she would not value the friendship for her own sake 
at all. That indifference to the relationship’s contribution to her 
own welfare is incompatible with good friendship. Even if I were 
similarly indifferent about my own welfare relative to Jiaying’s (so 
that our willingness to self-sacrifice were symmetrical), that’s still 
a problematic friendship. We would both effectively be regarding 
1 The psychological investments that most of us have in our relationships with inti-
mates are tremendously strong, deep, and rewarding. Quite likely, most of us rely on 
a combination of self- and other-directed concern to take advantage of recursive 
cumulative effects. Because I care about Jiaying (altruistically), advancing her 
interests is important to me, and so I see her welfare as contributing to my own 
(self-interestedly), and so it becomes easy to care about her interests even more 
(altruistically), which become an even more important good for me (self-interestedly), 
and so on. It is hard to imagine a person who can care as much and as deeply about 
someone without taking advantage of these effects.
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ourselves as instruments, as means to the other’s ends, and not as 
friends. Self-interest helps us guard ourselves from exploitation, and 
it also positions us as reciprocal partners in a friendship, a friendship 
that we care about for both of our sakes. In numerous ways, self-
interest makes relationships bettercloser, more invested in their 
shared ends, and both fairer to and more inclusive of all parties. 
As described above, the rich mixture of motives necessary to 
sustain mutually fulfilling relationships has at least two places for self-
interest. First, there are what we might call relationship-conducive 
self-interested desires, such as the desire to maintain a friendship 
because one sees it as having final value for oneself. Second, there 
are self-interested desires that help ensure fairness and reciprocity in 
relationships, so that both sides benefit from the relationship in ways 
that deepen and further cement bonds between them. 
For purposes of this paper, I take it as a necessary condition for 
an ethical theory that it be able to justify a certain sort of moral claim 
a claim about what I will call the comparative ethical value of good 
shared-end relationships. Here is a rough version of the claim: in many 
circumstances and for most people, it is ethically better that people 
be deeply and mutually invested in shared ends than not, and that 
type of deep and mutual investment requires self-interested motives. 
Purely altruistic motives have a certain sort of positive ethical value, 
and they are often admirable, but having good, mutually fulfilling 
relationships based on shared ends is a higher ethical priority. An 
adequate ethical theory should be able to make room for this claim, 
such that it determines that self-interested desires or inclinations can 
be ethically good if they play the right role in maintaining mutually 
fulfilling relationships.
3. Mutual Fulfillment and Shared Ends
Mutually fulfilling relationships come in different kinds, presupposing 
different sorts of motivation and ways of setting the goals to which 
they are committed. For purposes of my argument, I am most in-
terested in a subset of these relationships that I characterize as ethically 
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good ones. Let me say a little bit more about the broader range of 
possible relationships so as to highlight what is distinctive about the 
(ethically) good and mutually fulfilling ones in particular. We can 
think of mutually fulfilling relationships in terms of two dif ferent 
spectra or dimensions. One dimension concerns how much the 
parties to the relationship share the same ends and are motivated 
by those shared ends. At one extreme are relationships where the 
benefits that motivate each party are exclusively instrumental, and 
none are motivated by any shared ends (call these “transactional” 
relationships). Market exchanges often exemplify this sort of mutual 
fulfillment: one person gives up a product that she does not parti-
cularly need or want for a product that she does want, and vice versa. 
Each side gets some benefit, but for both, the other’s good is at best a 
means to her own. Neither derives any final value from realizing the 
ends valued by the other.2 
At the other extreme are relationships where one person’s moti-
vating end just is another person’s motivating end, where one-and-
the-same outcome has final value for all parties (call these “common 
causes”). Examples are shared social causes (a group of people in 
a political club or advocacy group, for example), or the interests of 
one or more parties in intimate relationships like those between 
family members or close friends. Family relationships are the most 
notable sort of example for Confucians like Dai Zhen. For Dai, there’s 
a sense in which a child’s survival and development just is a good for 
the parents, insofar as their survival and development is itself the 
realization of the parents’ own interest in procreation, continuing the 
family line, and reshaping the world and continuing their legacies 
through their offspring.
2 In this paper, I will assume that if a particular end has final value for someone then 
meeting or realizing the end is of some benefit to that person. How accurate this is 
depending on one’s particular conception of well-being, but it is true most of the 
time on most plausible conceptions. Realizing one’s final values is usually satisfying, 
gratifying, or a relief, and good for oneself for those reasons. On some conceptions 
of welfare, a person’s good just is the realization of states of affairs that they desire or 
value in a certain way.
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I would like to mention a certain in-between state or middle 
degree of relationship on this first dimension, because this type of 
relationship is important too. There are some arrangements in which 
the goods that motivate each party are a mix of instrumental and final 
ones. An example of this might be relationships between members 
of the same professional sports teamif the players on the team 
are at all emotionally invested in the team’s success, they will derive 
some final benefit when the team wins a championship or major 
tournament. Of course, the team’s success will have implications for 
their careers and salaries, and they care about that too. I find that 
many of the committees and short-term ad ministrative projects 
that I do at my university put me in similar relationships with other 
faculty and staff: we care enough about our university (or college, 
or department) that our objectives have some final value for us, but 
we derive some instrumental benefits from setting up new academic 
programs or finding ways to recruit more students. For lack of a 
better term, let us call these “collegial relationships.”
Instrumental vs. Final Value
1. Transactional relationships (purely instrumental for each party)
2. Collegial projects (some instrumental and some final value for 
each party)
3. Common causes (final value for each party)
I am most interested in relationships based on shared ends (types 2 
and 3), not transactional ones (type 1). Transactional relationships 
are fine and unavoidable, while the basic orbit of our ethical lives 
is set by a wide range of relationships which, given our history and 
circumstances, require that we develop shared commitments to the 
same ends. These are the deep relationships that provide most of us 
with indispensable sources of meaning and purpose. They also ask 
more of us, require that we meet more ethically demanding goals 
and instantiate virtues worthy of the name. 
The second dimension by which to measure relationships of 
mutual fulfillment is subtler. It has to do with how much one’s shared 
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end is mediated by concern for the other people in the relationship. 
This concerns not what motivates us to pursue the end, but what 
moti vates us to set the end in the first place. Compare the sense in 
which two fans of the same sports team (fans who are total strangers 
to one another) have shared ends, and compare that with how close 
friends and family members have shared ends. For the two fans
call them Mary and Meihuatheir ends just so happen to overlap. 
Mary does not want the Sharks to win because of any concern for 
Meihua, nor does Meihua care about the Sharks’ success because of 
any concern for Mary.  And yet there is a sense in which they are in 
a kind of relationship of mutual fulfillment, as they would embrace 
the spontaneous camaraderie and sense of kinship that they feel 
if they showed up at the same parade to celebrate a victory. In this 
case, Mary and Meihua have overlapping ends, but there is no other-
mediation of those ends. They just happen to overlap. 
In contrast, consider how parents and children, spouses, and good 
friends adopt one another’s ends. Sometimes I adopt an end of my 
parents’ or my friends’ solely for their sake. They care about a project 
deeply, so I do too, so that their end comes to have final value for me 
too. In these cases, for one or more parties, the ends are purely other-
mediated. Aristotle sometimes speaks of virtue friendships in this 
way: “. . . in loving their friend they love what is good for themselves; 
“for when a good person becomes a friend he becomes a good for his 
friend.”3 Perhaps it also helps to think of a loving parent or spouse 
who says she just wants her beloved to be happy, to live the life that 
they find most fulfilling, and nothing more. Often this is meant to 
indicate a purely other-mediated setting of ends.
As for the first dimension, for this second dimension there is also a 
middle degree. In what I will call “intertwined relationships,” multiple 
parties share the same end, which are goods that have final value for 
them all, but the ends are neither entirely other-mediated nor just 
incidentally overlapping. The setting of the ends is motivated in part by 
concern for both parties, or by concern for the relationship or the unit 
to which they belong. Often family interests mark out relationships 
3 Aristotle 2000 (Nicomachean Ethics 1157b30).
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of this sort: if moving a family to a new and better location with more 
opportunities is good for the family, each member of the family will 
probably be motivated by ends that are partially for the sake of the 
other family members and partially for their own sake. Most of my 
close friendships are instances of intertwining rather than purely 
other-mediated adoption of shared ends. I like it when my friends 
do well and are happy, though that’s not purely for their sake. It often 
seems good for our friendship too, and thus for me, insofar as a good 
friendship is a final good for me (and it is). Perhaps my emotional 
investment in my students’ success also suggests intertwining ends
it’s partially for their sake and partially for my own then I want them 
to learn and improve themselves. 
Self-Mediated vs. Other-Mediated End-Setting
1. Overlapping ends (purely self-mediated) 
2. Intertwined ends (both self-mediated and other-mediated)
3. Purely other-mediated ends
There is a tendency to admire and lionize the sorts of relationships 
that are most extreme in both of the respects I’ve outlined herethat 
is, relationships where the setting of an end is entirely other-mediated 
(adopting them purely for someone else’s sake) and one regards those 
ends as noninstrumentally valuable. Aristotelian virtue friendships 
are an object of fascination for this reason, both in scholarship and in 
the classroom. In some ethical scenarios that attract the most public 
attention in the English-speaking world (in Anglophone news media, 
films, and stories that capture the imagination and move us to tears) 
we often find paeans to selfless parenthood. However, it is clear that 
I am not primarily concerned with the most other-mediated sorts of 
relationshipswith relationships at the selfless extreme. Many people 
tend to find purely other-mediated end-setting to be quite admirable, 
and I agree. However, with Dai Zhen, I worry that such relationships 
also tend to be ethically inadequate, that they lack a certain quality 
of reciprocity and equality or evenness (ping ⸛) that takes account 
of all parties in the relationship. Ends should be set in such a way 
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that each party is empathically or sympathetically taking the other’s 
point of view into account as an equal starting point, or so we believe. 
To be ethically good relationships of mutual fulfillment, parties to a 
relationship must at least share some meaningful ends (so they must 
be relationships of the second or third type in the first dimension), and 
those ends must be set by some concern for all parties (so they must 
be of the second, “intertwined” type in the second dimension). This is 
one way to spell out the difference between relationships based on 
shared ends in general and the ethically good shared-end relationships 
that matter most.
Ethically Good Relationships of Mutual Fulfillment
1. Transactional relationships (purely instrumental for each party)
2. Collegial projects  
(some instrumental and some final value each party)
3. Common causes (final value for each party)
1. Overlapping ends (purely self-mediated) 
2. Intertwined ends (partially self-mediated, partially other-mediated)
3. Purely other-mediated ends
As explained in the previous section, the relationships of the relevant 
sort require a rich mixture of motives, some of which are self-
interested and some of which are more altruistic. This typology helps 
to say with more specificity why we need that rich mixture. One 
relatively obvious way that self-interest can help deepen a rela-
tionship is by giving us stronger attachments to others and more 
sources of satisfaction in helping them (as when I value a friend’s 
success and my friendship with her because of their contributions 
to my own interests and well-being). Nonetheless, there are less 
obvious ways in which self-interest can serve a person. Most notably, 
it can help us to advocate for a fairer or more reciprocal setting of 
ends. Motives matter not just because they get us to pursue and 
derive satisfaction from shared ends. They also matter because they 
help us to set the shared ends fairly and reciprocally. This also gives 
us a glimpse of the sophisticated ways in which self-interest might 
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factor in. It might serve as a higher-order motive that regulates first-
order ones: if I perceive that a friendship with someone is becoming 
too exploitative, too much about the friend and not me, I will become 
less inclined to do the things that maintain the friendship. It might 
also determine the character or valence of other motives: if an end 
that I share with a friend is purely mediated by her and does not 
take me into account, then any desire I have to pursue it becomes an 
altruistic one rather than a self-interested or mixed motive. Often, the 
self-interested motives will be quiet and nonconscious but “standing 
guard,” as it were, to make sure that our sacrifices do not become too 
onerous or asymmetrical.4 
I assume that in most ethically good and mutually fulfilling rela-
tionships, shared ends are constantly being revised and reconsidered 
(and sometimes renegotiated). This implies that we would do well 
to maintain self-interested motives on an ongoing basis. In one of 
Seneca’s more memorable letters on friendship, he seems to suggest 
that we should select our friends based on their potential to contribute 
to our own virtue and flourishing. Once we have committed to the 
friend, however, we should com mit completely. That, he seems to 
suggest, is how we realize that Aristotelian ideal of a purely altruistic 
friendship based on unconditional trust (Seneca 1969, 35–36).5 I 
disagree. For most shared ends, life is too unpredictable to commit 
once and for all. Our commitments to friendships should be resilient, 
they should last even through periods where they harm us more than 
they benefit us, so long as they are organized in such a way that they 
would characteristically or normally be more reciprocal. However, 
there are circumstances in which we can and should re evaluate them, 
and it is better, ethically speaking, that we take some account of our 
4 Think of buying gifts for a loved one. I can spend an afternoon looking for gifts with 
nary a thought about what it might cost me, but if I look at the price tag and find 
that it costs thousands of dollars, I will rediscover my limits and, with them, my self-
interested motives.
5 Note that Seneca’s proposal for instantiating lifelong unconditional love and trust 
between friends requires that friends assess and commit to one another in roughly the 
same ways as potential marriage partners.
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own interests in doing so, rather than permit ourselves to become 
exploited or more distant and unfulfilled friends.
Finally, it is worth noting that this analysis suggests at least two 
ways in which a relationship can become bad in the sense of being 
exploitative or asymmetrical. First, it might be that relationships are 
really designed to serve one or more party’s interests far more than 
another’s, so that even under normal circumstances, one party is 
being used or treated as a mere means to the interests of others. This 
worry is familiar enough as it looms in the background of many of 
our relationships. Nevertheless, there is a second and subtler sort of 
exploitation to guard against, and it has to do with fairness in how 
the shared ends and thus shared interests are set in the first place. 
I assume that there is a very real sense in which a child’s growth or 
happiness could be a shared end for both the child and her parent, 
and narrower goals (such as getting a college education or finding 
a lifelong romantic partner) can come to have some final value for 
both. Despite this, if the specification of those goals is not “fair”
if it does not give roughly equal weight to both party’s points of view, 
for examplethen the end can be exploitative even if it is shared. 
I would add (looking forward to the discussion of Kant) that it can be 
exploitative even if both parties consent or agree to the shared end. 
To assess a relationship for fairness in this sense we need to know 
not just whose individual interests are served but also how their 
shared interests are determined.
4. Dai Zhen on Mutually Fulfilling Relationships
Dai Zhen is a Confucian philosopher who has long been the object 
of a great deal of scholarly fascination. Intellectual historians are 
interested in him because he was, by most accounts, the most in-
novative and influential scholar of the Qing dynasty (1644–1912, 
China’s last imperial dynasty), a true polymath who made tremendous 
contributions to philology, mathematics, geography, and astronomy 
(Elman 2001; Hu 2015; Wu and Sun 2015). The pivotal intellectuals of 
China’s New Culture Movement in the early twentieth century were 
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interested in him because he seemed to be the one major philosopher 
of the indigenous Confucian tradition whose thought was most com-
patible with the more modern, naturalistic, and egalitarian ideas 
they sought to embrace (Hu 1996).6 Those who study the history of 
Chinese philosophy are interested in him because of his tremendous 
sophistication as a philosopher, which of all of Dai’s intellectual pur-
suits he regarded as his greatest calling.7 
If you were to ask a Confucian scholar of Dai’s era what was 
most important and distinctive about his ethical thought, he or she 
would likely say that it was his robust defense of human desire as a 
constituent of virtue. By Dai’s time, Confucian orthodoxy and even 
popular morality had been under the spell of a kind of asceticism 
and self-abnegationism for so long that most moral ideals made little 
room for many seemingly basic and legitimate desires. As I have tried 
to show in some of my previous work on Dai, what appears to be a 
dispute about desires in general turns out to be a dispute about self-
interested desires in particular, understood as desires for one’s own 
life-fulfillment or well-being for one’s own sake. Confucian orthodoxy 
and popular morality were perfectly fine with desires so long as they 
were virtuous ones. The problem that troubled Dai most was that 
they understood virtuous desires too narrowly as largely selfless 
ones, such that many desires for one’s own life-fulfillment as such 
(and for one’s own sake) would count as vicious. In direct opposition 
to this, Dai thought that we could not have the right sort of attitude 
toward others (caring about other people’s life-fulfillment for their 
sake) unless we have well-developed, self-interested desires (caring 
about our own life-fulfillment for our own sake) (Tiwald 2010a, 2012). 
We care about others in the right way by replicating and emulating 
proper self-concern. In Dai’s terminology, proper self-concern is 
“humane love of self” (renqishen ṩ℞幓).8
6 Dai was part of the “indigenous” Confucian tradition insofar as he lived and wrote 
before Confucians started to access and take an interest in non-Chinese and especially 
Western philosophy.
7 See Ivanhoe (2000, chap. 7; 2016, chap. 3) and Angle and Tiwald (2017, chaps. 3, 5, and 8).
8 See Dai (2009, sec. 21). 
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A Confucian scholar of Dai’s era would also have talked about 
Dai’s aversion to the metaphysical and metaethical views that had 
been popular in China for at least seven centuries, views that attri-
buted to all people a well-formed moral nature that they sometimes 
called our “original nature” or “inherent nature” (benxing 㛔⿏).9 Dai 
thought that this view was implausible, that it was an appropriation 
of the worst parts of Buddhism and Daoism, and that it lent itself 
to fundamental mistakes about how we justify ethical norms. Dai 
thought that our nature is good, but not fully developed or well-
formed. It has a natural propensity to become good, provided the 
right nurturance and education. 
Other features of Dai’s thought stand out more in retrospect than 
they did in his day. First, as I noted Dai was very concerned with how 
ethical norms are justified. He ultimately arrived at the following 
position: for any occasion in which you do something to others 
or expect something of them, your action or expectation must be 
one that could win universal approval under certain idealized cir-
cum stances. They must appeal to “invariant norms” (buyizhize ᶵ㖻 
ᷳ⇯) that all “hearts-and-minds would affirm in common” (xinzhi 
suotongran ⽫ᷳ㇨⎴䃞) (Dai 2009, secs. 4–6, 8). He did not provide a 
lot of examples as to how this process would work in practice, but he 
seems to have understood it primarily as an exercise in empathetic 
perspective-taking (imagining how you would think and feel if some-
one were treating you in some way) with reference to acceptable 
and unacceptable desires (so as to determine whether the desire that 
motivates the action or expectation would be universally approved).10 
On my reading, Dai comes to this universalizability criterion for a 
couple of reasons. First, he wants an ethical foundation that gives due 
consideration to everyone’s interests, meeting a standard of “fairness” 
or “evenness” (ping) that he takes to be fundamental (Dai 2009, secs. 
 9 See Ivanhoe (2000, chap. 4) and Zhu (2019, 16–24).
10 Dai (2009, sec. 2) and Ivanhoe (2000, chap. 7). Although Dai does not make it entirely 
explicit, he seems to understand the point of view from which we would affirm the 
invariant norms to be a common point of view, tracking not just how particular 
people think and feel but how anyone would think and feel if similarly placed and 
focusing on certain high-priority ethical feelings and desires.
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2, 30). Second, he wants a moral epistemology that allows for people 
to check or second-guess one another’s judgments. As historians 
have often noted, Dai himself was born to a poor family, one that 
was bullied by more powerful people who dressed their bullying 
in ethical language and may even have believed that their bullying 
was right. Dai thought the source of so much moral mischief in his 
time was an intransigent form of higher-order moral ignorance: not 
knowing what is right or good, not knowing that one does not know 
it, and having no reason in principle to take the criticisms of others 
into account. By insisting that a powerful person’s ethical judgments 
can in principle be assessed by many others, he puts a check on 
high-order ethical ignorance that he thought unavailable to others in 
his time, given their presuppositions (Dai 2009, secs. 4–5). 
Dai also had a great deal of interest in the relation between ethical 
imperatives, or what he called “what’s necessarily so” (biran ) 
with natural dispositions and inclinations, or what he called “what’s 
naturally so” (ziran ). Roughly, he thought that we should see ethical 
im peratives as an improvement upon or perfection of our natural 
inclinations, not as fundamentally discontinuous with them. When we 
embody and express the virtues, we are more perfect versions of our 
natural selves, not some new thing that has jettisoned its nature. Dai 
thought that this distinguished his view from prevailing moral views, 
which saw our natural inclinations as fundamentally flawed and 
appealed directly to transcendent norms and sources of motivation to 
help us overcome the bad parts of our natural endowment.11
I hope that this brief summary is enough to help us see how 
Dai both is and is not a kindred philosophical spirit with Kant. Like 
Kant, he thinks that moral actions must in principle be capable of 
11 Dai compared the practice of appealing to nature-transcendent norms to a certain 
sort of grammatical mistake, one that assumes that the significance of the attributive 
adjective “sagely” (sheng 俾) can be specified without reference to the sage’s humanity. 
In contemporary parlance, “sagely” is an attributive adjectiveits significance and 
specification depend in part on the kind of thing that it is attributed to. Similarly, 
“morally imperative” is specified with reference to the natural dispositions of the 
agent for whom it is imperative. Natural dispositions specify what it is to be moral in 
the same way that the humanity of the sage specifies what it is to be a sage. See Dai 
(2009, sec. 13).
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passing a test of universalizability. Furthermore, also like Kant, he 
was dissatisfied with metaethical theories that engaged in a lot of 
handwaving about some transcendent lawgiver or moral source, 
seemingly more interested in grounding human ethics in human 
interests broadly construed. As we will see later in this section, I 
also think that Dai was searching for a stronger sort of pro-attitude 
toward human beings than mere concern about their welfare, some-
thing that might be usefully compared with regarding others as ends 
in themselves. 
However, Dai’s philosophical inclinations are also quite different 
from Kant’s in other respects. For reasons that I find understandable 
but a bit ill-conceived, Kant was adamant that the only source of 
categorical imperatives should be pure practical reason and was thus 
reluctant to allow that contingent human desires could determine 
our unconditional moral demands. He seems to have concluded from 
this that desiresunderstood as contingent “inclinations” (Neigungen) 
that arise from our natural constitutionare also a bad or at least 
less-than-morally-worthy source of moral motivation. When people 
act morally, they should be acting out of respect for the moral law, 
not out of the contingent desires that at best only accidentally line up 
with the moral law (and usually do not).12 In contrast, Dai Zhen can 
not conceive of a plausible notion of ethical imperatives that does not 
take our natural inclinations into account, and is exasperated with 
the many generations of prior philosophers who seemed to think 
that such a project is possible. Ethical imperatives are improvements 
upon our natural inclinations or they are nothing at all. Moreover, 
he is emphatic that desires play a central and indispensable role in 
motivating good behavior, even self-interested desires. 
At this general level, my description of the differences between Kant 
and Dai is a bit impressionistic. How much of a tension there really 
is depends on some details that I do not have the time to delve into 
here (for example, does it make a difference that Dai only talks about 
moral imperatives in general and not categorical or unconditional 
12 Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, 4:416–420, 440–445. All references to 
Kant are based primarily on Mary Gregor’s translation (Kant 1996).
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imperatives more specifically?). Despite this, I hope  that these broad 
brushstrokes will be enough to appreciate the different philosophical 
agendas and orientations that the two philo sophers adopted. 
For Dai Zhen, a central notion in ethics is that of “mutual life-
ful fillment.” It is central in the sense that many other ethical notions 
are justified and specified in terms of it. For example, Dai thinks that 
certain core virtues are justified in large part by their ability to realize 
this value. One of Dai’s well-chosen paraphrases for the Confucian 
Way is “the way of mutual nourishment and growth” (xiangshengyang 
zhidao 䚠䓇梲ᷳ忻) (2009, secs. 11, 15). And he characterizes the central 
virtue of humaneness (ren ṩ) as “the virtue of mutual life ful fillment” 
(shengsheng zhide 䓇䓇ᷳ德) (sec. 36). Dai perceives (I think correctly) 
that most people, left to their own devices, see rela tion ships of mutual 
fulfillment as central to ethics (he blames Daoists and Buddhists 
for downplaying these sorts of relationships and thus distorting 
people’s natural sense of the core of ethics). Nonetheless, Dai pays 
more atten tion than most to the ethical and psychological structure 
of these relationships, and to the emotional dispositions and character 
traits needed to realize them. In this section I will talk about how he 
understands these relationships and what they require of us.
I take “fulfillment of life” (suisheng 䓇) to be Dai’s particular 
con ception of well-being. He thinks certain desires are intimately 
concerned with satisfying needs and interests that help to define 
us as living beings. Here he uses the Chinese character sheng 䓇, 
which refers not only to the state of being alive, but also to growth 
and reproduction. From Dai’s view, to fulfill a person’s life is to satisfy 
desires that have the right relation to her interest in survival, devel-
op ment, and procreation. Some desires are intimately connected to 
these goods (such as the desires for protection from the cold, sus-
tenance, having and raising children). Other desires might seem more 
peripheral or indirect but still clearly count as life-based because they 
are sufficiently rooted in survival, growth, or reproduction (such as 
desires for romantic love and marriage, intellectual development, 
and teaching the next generation of stu dents). He assumes that most 
of these desires are naturally flexible and of very wide scope, but 
they become narrower or more focused on specific outcomes as we 
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figure out how to adapt them to mutually beneficial relationships. 
I happen to think that Dai’s account of well-being stands up reason-
ably well to common criticisms of standard theories of well-being in 
the twentieth and twenty-first centuries (hedonism, desire theories, 
objective list theories, etc.). It certainly stands up better than simple 
hedonic theories or desire theories. But for present purposes, not a 
lot depends on Dai’s specific account of well-being. So long as your 
preferred account allows that people can share ends and benefit 
directly from realizing shared ends, it will be compatible with much 
of what Dai says about the ethics of mutual fulfillment.
Let me now say a bit about why Dai thinks that relationships of 
mutual fulfillment are central to ethics (such that the major virtues 
are defined and specified in reference to them). If one did not know 
any better, it might be tempting to think that Dai is focused on these 
sorts of relationships because they have a kind of quasi-economic 
efficiency or make a greater contribution to the sum of human in-
terests. Often, when multiple parties have the same ends and value 
them deeply, they will be better positioned for “win-win” propositions, 
such that one and the same outcome benefits all sides rather than 
set up one side to win at the other’s expense. The net total of human 
well-being that we can get is greater when people’s ends are shared 
than when they are different or in competition with one another. This 
argument appeals to “net benefit” or “net well-being” as a justification 
for good relationships of mutual fulfillment.
No doubt, Dai (like most of us) thinks it an advantage of these 
sorts of relationships that they make possible greater total satis-
faction of desires, greater fulfillment of important goals, and thus 
more well-being. However, Dai does not think that welfare simpliciter 
is the central good. His organizing principle is what I call “orderly 
life-fulfillment.” “Life-fulfillment” is indeed a particular conception of 
well-being, but life-fulfillment must be in good order. “Order” (tiaoli 
㡅䎮) tracks such things as social proximity, social status by virtue 
of age, merit, or desert and makes provisions for sustainability or 
continuity of living things. In Dai’s account of the virtues, he says 
that some are more concerned with promoting life-fulfillment, but 
otherssuch as ritual propriety (li 䥖Ī and righteousness (yi 佑)are 
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more concerned with tracking norms of good order (2009, sec. 36). 
Promoting life-fulfillment is virtuous so long as it takes some account 
of proximity, status, merit, and desert, making sure that our loved 
ones are the top priority, that elders are treated more deferentially 
than youth, that we are not showering un deserved benefits on people 
who should be punished (and are not punishing people who did no 
wrong), etc. Furthermore, Dai believes that social worlds with good, 
mutually fulfilling relationships are just better than those without, 
and that people who facilitate such relationships are ethically better 
than those that merely provide for their own well-being, even if 
those relationships were to come at some cost to net well-being. It 
is better for us to live as parents, children, siblings, and friends than 
as detached strangers. Dai says that we can enhance our admiration 
of relationships of mutual fulfillment by noticing how the cosmic 
order (“Heaven and Earth”) is also engaged in ongoing mutual life-
fulfillment and ongoing creation (sec. 36). In short, Dai is not a welfarist 
he does not think that well-being is the sole source of moral norms 
and values. His central good is orderly life-fulfillment, captured most 
powerfully in the vision of reciprocal processes that provide for our 
continuity into future generations.
Let me now turn to one of the most intriguing facets of Dai’s moral 
psychology, which has to do with the self-interested desires which 
I have mentioned. For Dai, good relationships of mutual fulfillment 
require a certain kind of self-interest that he calls “humane love of 
self” (sec. 21).13 In an oft-quoted passages in his Evidential Analysis 
of the Meanings of Terms in the Mengzi, Dai contends that a certain 
kind of love of self is continuous with love of those near and dear to 
oneself, and falls within the territory of humaneness (renzhishu ṩᷳⰔ), 
a core Confucian virtue (sec. 21). In another memorable passage Dai 
argues that a certain amount of interest in one’s own life-fulfillment 
is necessary in order to properly and adequately empathize with 
others. As he says at one point, “If one lacked desires [to fulfill one’s 
own life], one would look apathetically on even the most destitute and 
dire of life’s circumstances” (sec. 10). There is no way to arrange our 
13 For more on humane love of self, see the second paragraph in this section.
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emotional dispositions such that we could care in the correct way for 
others without caring ourselves (sec. 10). Dai thinks that humane love 
of others simulates and draws on humane love of self, so that we must 
continue to humanely love ourselves in order to sustain humane love 
of others.
In one of my first articles I did a close reading of some passages 
in Dai’s philosophical work to reconstruct what I take to be some 
notable features of humane love of self and explain why this is 
necessary to have the right sort of empathy for others (Tiwald 2010b). 
Briefly, I take it that Dai thinks when we love ourselves humanely, 
we love ourselves independently of ethically irrelevant properties or 
relations. Most of us love ourselves (if we do) regardless of whether 
we are high status or low, healthy or sick, wealthy or poor. Dai likes 
to note that a certain kind of empathetic concern cuts through such 
differences of position and fortune, and on my reading, Dai thinks we 
need to draw on the unconditional love of self to recreate a similar 
sort of love for others. When we love the self humanely we love the 
bare particular and not any of its accidental properties or relations 
(Tiwald 2010b). A second feature of humane love of self is that one 
loves oneself for one’s own sake, not for the sake of someone else 
or some higher end. We do not care about our own interests just 
insofar as contributing to them contributes to the prosperity of our 
employer, family, or society. A third (and important) feature of this 
love is what properties it does treat as necessary and fundamental 
to our status as worthy of love. Dai is quite clear that what gives us 
ethical status and intrinsic considerability is a combination of three 
things: being a living creature, being a creature that loves its life 
and fears its death, and having conscious awareness (jue 奢) (secs. 
21, 30). Therefore, it is not, for example, because we are legislators 
in the realm of ends or because of a certain power or capacity for 
autonomy that we are worthy of love. Humane love of self has these 
three featuresit loves the bare particular, for one’s own sake, and 
considers us worthy of love because we are living creatures with 
awareness and a love of life and fear of death. On my reading of Dai 
Zhen, these are the very features that we replicate (but sometimes 
to a lesser degree) in humane love of others, and from which we 
4(2][\in <i_IZd)0131.indd   125 20. 3. 3.   오후 3:08
126  Volume 33 /Journal of Confucian Philosophy and Culture
construct a common point of view that can be inhabited by many 
different people with mature capacities for wisdom and empathy.
Let us now see in action how Dai’s framework can be used to 
account for the ethical value of deriving mutual fulfillment from 
shared ends. Consider the shared end of a child’s formal education. 
Let us say that Jiaying has a daughter, Chen, whom she wants to 
provide with an education in the interest of promoting Chen’s intel-
lectual and ethical development. Both Jiaying and her daughter see 
her daughter’s education as having some final valuehaving a more 
mature and spiritually and intellectually well-rounded Chen is in 
some sense the very goal that both seek to realize. Of course, they also 
both see her education as having some instrumental benefits as well, 
insofar as it will expand Chen’s career opportunities, give her more 
or greater sources of gratification and so on. On my under standing, 
part of what makes Chen’s formal education a shared end is that for 
both her and her mother, getting this education is relatively high on 
the list of valuable priorities that they care about, such that both are 
willing to sacrifice other competing interests or goods for its sake. So 
both think that some of the family’s resources and luxuries are worth 
giving up in order to pay for Chen’s tuition, for example, and that they 
rightly give up time playing games or listening to music in the interest 
of giving her more time to study or work on school projects. Having 
her education as a shared end thus has implications for trade-offs 
that they ought to make at various points in their lives. Some of those 
trade-offs will be obvious and relatively uncontroversial: clearly, it 
would be better to pay for Chen’s college tuition than to build a new 
addition to their already spacious home. Other trade-offs will require 
more wisdom and ethical discernmentwhether Jiaying should 
intervene on Chen’s behalf when, for example, she thinks one of 
Chen’s teachers is treating her unfairly. 
On Dai’s account, each of these decisions will be resolved by 
adopting a certain empathetic point of view, one that asks them 
to imagine themselves in the position of various affected parties 
and tranquilly reflect on whether they could reasonably bear the 
treatment they are giving them or fulfill the demands that they are 
making on them (2009, sec. 2). Dai thinks that certain demands will 
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seem more reasonable to fulfill and certain kinds of treatment will 
seem more reasonable to endure if they are motivated by and meant 
to fulfill certain common and widely-shared desires, desires that we 
as intelligent living beings can all understand and stand behind. It is 
in these senses that the relevant ethical norms are those which “all 
hearts-and-minds affirm in common.” They are norms that seem 
warranted from multiple, somewhat idealized, points of view, and 
they take as their object a state of affairs which reasonably mature 
people can empathically imagine as satisfying or fulfilling enough to 
justify the sacrifice of other goods (secs. 2-8).   
In order to realize the shared end of Chen’s formal education, 
Jiaying will need certain thingsresources, various habits, emotional 
attachments, powers to ignore impulses or delay gratification, apti-
tudes of judgment, and so on. Some of these things will be banal or 
not particularly admirable or notable. However a certain subset of 
these things will, when working in tandem, exhibit a certain excel lence 
or ethical beauty (yi ㆧ or mei 伶) (secs. 3, 36). Those character traits 
and characteristic behaviors that both exhibit this sort of excellence 
and play the right sort of supporting role in realizing “orderly life 
fulfillment” are virtues, and insofar as Jiaying instantiates these 
virtues, she is much better or more ethical than she would be without 
them. Dai says that some of these virtues (such as humaneness and 
righteousness) are themselves constituents of orderly life-fulfillment, 
and others (such as courage) are just the means by which we bring 
about orderly life-fulfillment (sec. 36). Either way, so long as they fit 
together into a system of character traits and characteristic behaviors 
that constitute or help to sustain the central good, and so long as they 
exhibit excellence, they make Jiaying a much better person than she 
would otherwise be.14
14 Given that Dai justifies some virtues (like courage) as means to the central good 
of orderly life fulfillment, some might be tempted to say that the virtues are 
instrumentally valuable. However, this does not follow. Often, we see some virtues 
as virtuous in part for what they accomplish, but nevertheless see the instantiation 
of those virtues as valuable in their own right. Just as we can value someone’s 
compassion and courage in attempting to save an endangered child even if she does 
not succeed, so too we can admire Jiaying’s compassion and courage in sup porting 
and advocating for her daughter’s education even if she is not successful.
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5. Kant on Mutually Fulfilling Relationships
On a certain caricature of Kant, he thinks there is really only one kind 
of motive worth adopting and one kind of behavior worth emulating, 
which are sometimes jointly characterized as action from duty. This 
is the sort of thing that we do when we represent the moral law in 
our minds and act out of respect for that moral law. According to 
this caricature, action motivated by any desire is always problematic 
because all desires are contingent things with no built-in capacity to 
follow the moral law, which makes them at best conditionally and 
accidentally good. Nature does not guarantee that our desires will do 
as the moral law requires, only practical reason and the will can do 
that, insofar as they inspire in us respect for the moral law. Desires 
respond to the senses and sensible objects, not to a priori reason and 
moral normsin Kant’s term, they are “pathological” (pathologische). 
Moreover, the desires are stubborn things, intransigent and gener ally 
difficult to change, and they only treat our own happiness or pleasure 
as their guiding aim, not morality.15 For all of these reasons, this story 
goes, an action has moral value if and only if it is motivated by the 
good will and not by desires of any kind.
However, this caricature is mistaken. Among other things, it 
ig nores both the content and the prominent aims of his relatively 
late work, The Metaphysics of Morals, which includes considerable 
discussion of the virtues. There he suggests that natural dispositions 
can be trained and reshaped, as when he recommends that people 
visit sick rooms and debtors’ prisons in order to fine-tune their sym-
pathetic appreciation of the suffering of others. He also claims that 
we should secure a moderate amount of happiness for ourselves 
lest we become so disgruntled that we start transgressing the moral 
law or ignoring our duties on a regular basis.16 So Kant clearly en-
dorses a limited pursuit of one’s own welfare, and seems to think 
that pathological emotions and desires can be changed so that they 
15 See Critique of Practical Reason 5: 19–30 for passages that have been taken to suggest 
this reading.
16 See Metaphysics of Morals 6: 457, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals 4: 399.
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better align with morality. What, then, are we to make of his strong 
claims to the effect that only action from duty (action motivated by 
will and representations of the moral law) is good?
In late twentieth- and early twenty-first-century Western philo-
sophy, a great deal has been written on the place of virtue and the 
components of good character in Kant’s ethics.17 I cannot hope to 
summarize it all, but let me highlight the arguments that are most 
relevant for my discussion. The first thing to note is that when Kant 
talks about the distinctive value of action from duty or the good will, 
he does not say that this motivational structure is necessary for value 
in general but for “moral worth” in particular.18 This presumably 
leaves open the possibility that other sorts of action can instantiate 
a different and presumably lesser sort of ethical or moral value. 
Second, defenders of Kant have proposed that Kant intended duty 
and respect for the moral law not just as the direct impetus to 
action, but as a kind of background condition or commitment that 
governs or regulates the more direct springs of human behavior 
(Marcia Baron calls this background condition a “secondary motive” 
and the direct impetus a “primary motive”). So a person can still 
have or express moral worth if, for example, she helps someone 
from a desire to please, so long as that primary motive is checked 
or conditioned by an overarching and overriding commitment to 
morality, and provided that overriding commitment is sufficient to 
effect dutiful behavior (Baron 1995, 113-114, 188-193). So long as the 
will stands ready to intervene on behalf of a representation of duty, 
and so long as it has the power to override primary motives to that 
end, a person can act from duty even as the direct impetus to action 
is one or more of our pathological desires, including, presumably, 
self-interested desires.
These two corrections go a good distance toward addressing 
the challenge that I have set for Kant. The challenge was to provide 
an ethical framework that helps to explain why it is ethically better 
to be the sort of person with mixed motives to participate in and 
17 For example, see Baron (1995), Betzler (2007), and Herman (2007).
18 For example, see Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals 4: 398–400.
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contribute to good relationships than not, to have the mixed motives 
that make the good sorts of mutual fulfillment possible. What the two 
clarifications show is that Kant can in principle explain how someone 
might be motivated to help a friend partially by self-interest and yet 
be a person that (or carry out an action that) instantiates or imparts 
moral worth. Someone can be partially motivated to help a friend by 
self-interest in the primary sense, and that is just fine so long as there 
is a potentially overriding will that stands ready to intervene on behalf 
of the moral law. 
Nonetheless, this does not address the challenge completely. 
First, on Kant’s view, moral worth is still solely a function of the duty 
motive. Kant does not suggest that having additional, self-interested 
but relationship-conducive motives adds or enhances moral worth. 
If we take someone who helps a friend purely out of duty but does 
so grudgingly and compare him with someone who helps a friend 
wholeheartedly and with great personal interest, by Kant’s lights 
both are equal in moral worth. The challenge was to show how the 
latter could be ethically better than the former, as most people in 
fact believe. Second, it does not address another feature of Kant’s 
moral psychology, which is that he sees desires as unresponsive to 
the sorts of reasoning that tracks the moral law. Being “pathological,” 
desires and emotions only respond to the senses and sensible objects, 
and at least some passages of Kant’s moral writings suggest that 
our desires and emotions are too intransigent to be meaningfully 
modified or updated.
These clarifications also raise a more fundamental conceptual 
issue that we should pause to consider. On this more nuanced picture 
of Kant’s ethical theory, someone with the motivational set that 
enables her to derive mutual fulfillment from her relationships can 
have moral worth under those circumstances (or her relationship-
conducive actions can have moral worth), but only if there is an 
overriding secondary motive the ensures compliance with the moral 
law. If there is no such motive, or if there is such a motive but it is 
not sufficient to override, she (or her actions) cannot have moral 
worth. However, that front loads a rather formidable requirement for 
moral worth from the very start. Do we really want to insist that so 
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much volitional capacity for moral compliance is necessary for any 
moral worth at all? One reason that I think the most influential moral 
theories have done such a poor job accounting for the comparative 
ethical value of good relationships of mutual fulfillment is because 
they tend to be constructed around ideal agents or instances of agency. 
We want to know whether it makes significant ethical difference 
whether Jiaying is a relatively distant parent who cares about her 
children for their sake or a deeply engaged and multi-faceted parent 
who cares about them partially for their sake and partially out of pride, 
shared projects, and a personal interest in having and raising children. 
To most of us, it does not seem that it should only make a difference 
if Jiaying also has a commitment to the moral law that is sufficient 
to override the relevant desires. Quite possibly, most of us lack that 
commitment, and yet there is a world of difference between a cold 
and distant parent and a deeply attached parent who derives mutual 
fulfillment from parenting. Therefore, it is fundamentally mistaken 
to insist on the requirement that there be an overriding secondary 
motive of duty. Having that overriding secondary motive can be a 
good and productive ideal, something that people should aspire to, 
but it is too demanding and stringent to insist that it be a necessary 
condition for all moral worth.
Perhaps Kant would say that the weak-willed parent who derives 
proper mutual fulfillment from her parenting is ethically better in 
some sense that does not involve moral worth. I hinted at this sort 
of solution earlier when I mentioned that there may be values or 
goods other than moral worth that can help to justify certain impure 
motivational sets. Maybe Kant recognizes that it’s good for people to 
learn to care about their children in the rich mixture of ways required 
for mutual fulfillment, but he does not think these should count as 
moral improvements, or as bases for moral worth. However, they still 
count as improvements in some sense, and Kant thereby provides us 
with reasons to pursue love and sympathy. 
My objections are difficult to spell out in detail because they 
depend on how we specify the special status of moral worth re la-
tive to other ethical goods or values. Despite this, here is a rough 
description of the concern: whatever it means for one thing to impart 
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moral worth and for another thing to be a mere good, Kant’s ranking 
of moral worth above all other values must at least imply that moral 
worth should have some sort of clear priority. For example, perhaps 
he thinks that given an opportunity to do something of moral 
worth or to something that is merely ethically good, one should do 
something of moral worth. However, if we were to give clear priority 
to action from duty over the desires necessary for proper mutual 
fulfillment, this would have implications that most of the world’s 
people (at most times and places) would find counter-intuitive. 
Surely being a deeply engaged and caring parent who is deeply 
invested in one’s parenthood is of far higher priority than having 
the strength of will to rein in one’s parental desires in the interest of 
the moral law.
In pursuit of a better defense of Kantian approaches to relation-
ships of mutual fulfillment, we have to set aside the historical Kant 
and consider a modified version of him, making some revisions to 
his view that, we can hope, will leave his core ethical commitments 
intact. Among the most promising revisions are those suggested 
by a forthcoming article by Kyla Ebels-Duggan, who attempts to 
clean up problems in Kant’s moral psychology by proposing that 
Kantians jettison the view that desires are pathological. Desires on 
this revised view can represent values and objects as valuable or 
choice-worthy, thus giving us a degree of control over them. Having 
a degree of control over them, they become “attributable to us,” so 
that the actions motivated by those desires can have moral worth. If a 
desire represents someone as worthy of respect and love, for example, 
then to act on it is to “act in response to the value of humanity” 
as surely as the will can so act (Ebels-Duggan, forthcoming). In 
principle, at least, someone who has the desires to derive mutual 
fulfillment from her relationships could count as having greater 
moral worth for that reason. Furthermore, Ebels-Duggan’s revisions 
appear to lower the price of admission for moral worth, for it is no 
longer necessary that one have the strength of will and commitment 
to moral law to override a desire in order to count as morally worthy. 
So long as the desire itself represents someone as worthy of respect 
and love, the resultant action qualifies.
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If Kantian ethics is to be saved from the charge that it cannot 
explain the comparative ethical value of good relationships of 
mutual fulfillment, this sort of move offers the best hope for doing 
so. Kantians need to allow that desires can carry and impart moral 
worth. Still, even this revisionary picture of Kant’s ethics faces 
formidable challenges. Firstly, depending on what “representing 
someone as worthy of respect and love” requires, we could still end 
up with an ethical theory that attributes much higher priority to 
what are in fact comparatively trivial acts and motives and under-
estimates the ethical importance of human relationships. The 
desires of love, for example, seem good candidates for the sorts of 
desires that Ebels-Duggan has in mind, but it seems likely that love 
more often than not falls short of this ideal, certainly if representing 
someone as worthy of respect and love entails representing her as 
an end in herself and never as means only (as Kant rightly worried, 
love often instrumentalizes the beloved). 
A second problem is this: even though Ebels-Duggan’s view 
about the range of motives that might impart moral worth is 
more permissive and inclusive, it is not permissive enough to be 
compatible with widely-shared intuitions about the motives neces-
sary for good relationships of mutual fulfillment. On the view that I 
find most defensible, there is a wide array of dispositions or character 
traits that can impart ethical value or worth, whether or not they 
happen to represent people as worthy of love and respect. Dai Zhen’s 
view on this matter is more promising: he thinks that an ethical 
virtue is an admirable character trait that cooperates with other 
admirable character traits to promote or constitute the central good, 
which for him is orderly life-fulfillment. Some admirable character 
traits (such as courage) do not characteristically represent people 
as worthy of love and respect, and they can be virtues nonetheless, 
just by being admirable in their own right and fitting rightly into the 
constellation of other virtues. Similarly, there are habits of mind and 
mental and emotional dispositions in good parenting and teaching 
that seem good candidates for bearers of ethical worth, things like 
resourcefulness or capacity to listen thoughtfully and charitably, 
and yet I doubt that they themselves are constituted of desires that 
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represent people as worthy of love and respect.
This second problem may be symptomatic of a deeper issue of 
theoretical orientation that I alluded to earlier. The deeper issue has 
to do with whether we see certain distinctive features of morality as 
minimum requirements or as one important factor among others. 
Imagine that we could reach a consensus about the criteria that a 
motive must meet in order to qualify as bestowing this important 
sort of moral value. For example, both Kant and Dai think that there 
there’s a special imperative to recognize all other people as similar 
to ourselves in certain respects, and to see others as having intrinsic 
worth, and as having interests that in some important way have 
equal purchase on the norms of interpersonal interactions. Even 
if we can reach an agreement about the criteria for this privileged 
set of norms, however, there is still the question of how those 
criteria operate. One possibility, which from my view is ubiquitous 
in both Kant’s ethics and much Kantian ethics, is that criteria serve 
as a necessary condition for any and all moral worth. Only if one 
represents or conceives of others and one’s moral obligations to 
others in a certain way will the relevant motives qualify as having this 
special moral status. But another option is that the criteria serve as 
a special kind of regulative idealsomething to aspire to, such that, 
ceteris paribus, we become better people (or have better character 
or exhibit better behaviors) the more closely we approximate it. 
The latter view is closer to Dai Zhen’s, and because he treats the 
special norms governing interpersonal interactions as a regulative, 
aspirational ideal in this way, he can make allowances for kinds of 
ethical improvements and trade-offs that Kant cannot. He can say, for 
example, that it’s preferable that a teacher always treat her students 
as having intrinsic value and as equal end-setters, and to the extent 
that she fails to do so, she’s a nonideal teacher, but he can also allow 
that there are other sorts of ethical improvement which might, under 
some circumstances, be of higher priority. For example, it is better 
for many teachers to take self-interested pride in the success of their 
students than to be distant or indifferent to their students’ success, 
even if this pride sometimes comes at the expense of regarding stu-
dents instrumentally or as less-than-equal end-setters.
4(2][\in <i_IZd)0131.indd   134 20. 3. 3.   오후 3:08
Shared Ends: Kant and Dai Zhen. . .   135
Finally, there are worries about whether the move to admit some 
value-regarding desires into the club of morally worthy motives 
can be integrated into Kant’s broader moral framework, one so 
systematically devoted to clarifying the proper source of morality 
in pure practical reason and purging morality of impure sources. 
For example, Kant is correct to think that natural desires often go 
wrong, inclining us toward courses of action that ride roughshod 
over the interests of others, instrumentalize others, or treat others 
unjustly. It seems like any reasonably conscientious Kantian (and 
Kant himself) would insist that we at least vet our desires so that 
only those that aptly respond to the value of humanity are trusted 
and acted upon. Nevertheless, there is little in Kant that will ground a 
plausible or enlightening story about how the desires can be vetted, 
since his framework so frequently depends on the intervention of 
an independent faculty of will acting on the representations of pure 
practical reason. In stark contrast to this, Dai Zhen provides a realistic 
and appealing account of the sources of interpersonal ethics, one that 
builds ethical motives on natural ones and yet makes a compelling 
case that these improvements make us more aptly responsive to the 
value of others. And as we have seen, at most every turn his system 
is concerned with grounding good relationships based on shared 
ends. If we concede that such relationships are a central or at least 
an important part of our ethical lives, as I think we must, then Dai’s 
framework seems the better starting point for an adequate theory 
of ethics.
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